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1 Introduction
Tax revenue as a proportion of GDP is typically about 20 percentage points lower
in African countries than in rich OECD countries. Reforms are needed to improve
the efficiency of African tax systems and to provide reliable revenue at low social
cost. This is particularly important now, as rich countries emerge from the global
financial crisis with high debt. It is unlikely that development assistance will
increase significantly in the near future, and there is a risk that aid could be
reduced. So the paper examines suitable directions for African tax reform. More
specifically, if extra revenue is to be raised, should it be achieved by extending
taxes to untaxed parts of the economy, or by raising existing tax rates? If the
overall tax effort is too low, are there nevertheless particular taxes which should
be repealed? The answers to such questions depend on the marginal cost of public
funds (MCF)—the change in social welfare associated with raising an additional
unit of tax revenue using a particular tax instrument. The paper hence estimates
the marginal cost of public funds for five key tax instruments—domestic sales
taxes, import and export taxes, and corporate and personal income taxes—in 38
African countries.
The central role of the MCF in tax policy is well known. A given level of revenue
can be obtained at lower welfare cost by increasing a tax with a low MCF and
lowering a tax with a high MCF. The literature on this topic dates back at least
thirty years, but it is almost entirely focused on the tax systems of high income
countries. MCF estimates are particularly hard to come by for African countries,
given the paucity of data and the difficulty of adapting sophisticated computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models to obtain these estimates.1 Moreover, the few
estimates that exist may not be comparable because of differences of modeling
techniques. Thus, the challenge as we have conceived it is to develop a simple CGE
model that can be calibrated with little more than national accounts data, and
can be used to provide consistent estimates comparable across African countries.
This enables lessons to be drawn from their variation.
One important feature of our model is that it deals explicitly with the informal
economy, a key requirement for realism in the African context. As a by-product of
our model’s calibration, we have produced estimates of the untaxed economy (see
Table 11 in the Appendix). Viewing GDP as the sum of all output, our calibration
algorithm indicates untaxed goods represent an average of 35% of GDP. Viewing
GDP as the sum of all income, untaxed factor payments constitute an average
1Substitution effects, which are at the heart of the dead-weight loss of taxation, are poorly
captured by partial equilibrium analysis. CGE models are required because real tax systems are
complex, and because it is necessary to take account of multiple interactions within tax systems.
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56% of GDP. Our measures of the untaxed economy are not identical with efforts
to measure the shadow economy, such as Schneider & Enste (2000). To the extent
that the shadow economy includes activities that are not caught in measures of
GDP, our measure is smaller. To the extent that we include legal activities that
are captured in GDP and happen not to be taxed by one of our five taxes, our
measure is larger.
Inclusion of the informal sector in the model is important in two respects. First
it permits us to compute taxes on domestic goods and factor taxes using legally
specified rates, rather than ‘effective’ tax rates which are commonly modeled in
CGEs.2 Second we might suspect that in countries with larger informal sectors,
it is easier for economic agents to shift from formal to informal activity. Greater
substitutability would lead to higher marginal costs of taxation on formal activity.
Comparison of estimates of MCF across the 38 countries reveals the importance of
the size of the informal sector as a determinant of the magnitude of MCFs. Larger
informal sectors are typically associated with higher MCFs.3
Our MCF estimates of the five key tax instruments provide a lens through which
many of the major issues of African tax reform can be viewed. Over the past 10-
20 years, African countries have lowered trade taxes to improve competitiveness,
and introduced VATs, in part to compensate for lost trade tax revenues. In our
38 countries, from the early 1990s to the mid 2000s, on average trade taxes fell
from 35.2% of tax revenue to 29.6%, while total tax revenue rose on average from
13.7% to 17.1% of GDP.4 Our model and MCF estimates suggest directions for
further reform of tax structures. Low values of MCF estimates indicate that in
most countries additional revenue could be raised with relatively low efficiency
cost, in most cases using higher VATs, but in some cases through higher trade
2‘Effective’ tax rates are calculated as tax revenues divided by sector size. They provide
an average between taxpayers who pay tax at something like the legal rate, subject to some
under-reporting, and informal producers or consumers who pay no tax. Effective tax rates
underestimate the marginal tax rate incurred by those who actually pay tax and are thus likely
to underestimate MCFs.
3Fortin & Lacroix (1994) suggest the informal sector accounts for around 0.02-0.05 of their
MCF estimates of 1.39-1.53 for labour taxation in Canada. They note that although small,
the impact of the informal sector increases rapidly with the level of the marginal tax rate.
The importance of the informal sector when analyzing taxation in developing countries is also
emphasized in other settings by García Peñalosa & Turnovsky (2005) and Emran & Stiglitz
(2005).
4These figures are based on data from IMF country report Statistical Annexes, using the
earliest and most recent data available from reports available online. The periods covered differ
for each country, with 1992/3 the median first year, and 2005 the median final year. Trade tax
revenues as a proportion of GDP rose from 4.7% to 4.9% on average. The share of trade taxes
in tax revenue rose in 15 countries, and tax revenue as a proportion of GDP fell in 9 countries.
The list of 30 countries that now have VATs is included in our data set in Appendix 2.
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taxes. We find no general rules that imports or exports should not be taxed,
so that MCF estimates are needed in order to determine appropriate change in
trade taxes. Finally, we estimate low MCFs in the informal economy, indicating
priorities for the removal of tax exemptions and for the inclusion of untaxed parts
of the economy.
After a brief review of the existing literature in Section 2, we present the model
in Section 3. The model is inspired by the minimal data requirements of the ‘1-2-3
model’ of Devarajan, Go, Lewis, Robinson, & Sinko (1994). The basic 1-2-3 model
has one country with two producing sectors and three goods: a domestic good,
exports and imports. This model is extended to include production of an informal
good, an intermediate investment good, and four factors of production: formal
capital, informal capital, formal labour and informal labour. Our definition of an
informal good or factor is one on which no tax is paid. We thus use the terms
‘untaxed’ and ‘informal’ interchangeably.
In section 4 we apply the CGE model to produce estimates of MCFs for five
taxes in 38 African countries, vastly increasing the number of developing countries
for which MCF estimates exist. Our base case estimate of the average MCF from
marginal increases in all five tax instruments is 1.21, with a plausible range of
1.19 to 1.29. These estimates provide a basic blueprint for tax reform in Africa,
indicating the high cost taxes that are ripe for cutting, and the low cost taxes which
could be increased. Sensitivity testing of the model reveals which elasticities are
the most important in determining MCF magnitudes, and suggests that our base
case estimates are reasonably robust for purposes of tax reform. We also estimate
the impact of administrative costs on MCFs.
In Section 5 we examine two central aspects of tax reform—the reform of tax
structures, and the priorities for extending the tax base—with particular atten-
tion to the implications of Africa’s large informal sectors. We ask whether African
policies of lowering trade taxes and expanding the application of VATs are ap-
propriate. We find the VAT and import tariff are typically the key optimal tax
instruments, but in some cases taxes on exports and factors are also optimal. The
optimality of taxes on inputs follow from the presence of the informal economy.
In respect of tax base broadening, we ask how much administrative cost should
be spent in order to bring parts of the informal economy into the tax system. On
average we find quite high administrative cost thresholds above which efforts to
impose an existing tax on currently untaxed sectors would be more costly than
simply raising the existing tax rates.
We conclude in section 6 with a review of several issues in African tax reform,
interpreted in the light of our results.
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2 The Marginal Cost of Public Funds
The MCF measures the change in social welfare associated with raising an addi-
tional unit of tax revenue using a particular tax instrument:
MCF = −∆W
∆R
(1)
where ∆W is a monetary measure of the change in social welfare and ∆R is the
change in tax revenue arising from a marginal change in a tax instrument. The
change in social welfare is a measure such as the equivalent variation or change in
consumer surplus. Table 1 sets out a selection of existing estimates. Additional
estimates are reported by Dahlby (2008), who provides a comprehensive treatment
of the existing MCF estimates.
Unfortunately, existing estimates are not all comparable. The literature is
plagued by multiple definitions of the same concepts. Useful reviews of the the-
oretical and empirical literature on MCFs can be found in Ballard & Fullerton
(1992), Devarajan et al. (2002) and Dahlby (2008). Different measures of the
MCF for the same tax instrument can be found according to the nature of the
tax experiment conducted, the choice of numeraire, and the attribution of some
general equilibrium effects between benefit and cost.
Ballard & Fullerton (1992) identify two broad classes of theoretical analysis:
‘differential’ and ‘balanced budget.’ In differential analysis, one tax is marginally
increased and another is decreased sufficiently to maintain the budget balance.
The usual experiment is to increase a distortionary tax, and to reduce a lump-sum
tax (return the revenue to consumers as a lump-sum). The income effects of the
two tax changes cancel, leaving only substitution effects. Estimates of the welfare
change,∆W , depend on compensated elasticities, while the change in revenue,∆R,
can be equated with the actual lump-sum transfer. In balanced-budget analysis,
one tax is marginally increased and the revenue is spent on a public project.
Income effects are included in the analysis, and MCF estimates are derived using
uncompensated elasticities. These are not the only possible measures. Wildasin
(1984) proposed a measure in which the compensated change in welfare is divided
by the compensated change in tax revenue rather than the actual change in tax
revenue.
The choice of numeraire can also change estimates of the MCF. Håkonsen
(1998) has proposed a measure derived from the dual of the government’s optimal
tax problem (maximize revenue subject to a given level of social welfare) that is
invariant to the choice of numeraire.
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Table 1: Selected MCF Estimates
Country Tax type Estimate Source
Australia Labour 1.19-1.24 Campbell & Bond (1997)
Australia Labour 1.28-1.55 Findlay & Jones (1982)
Australia Capital 1.21-1.48 Diewert & Lawrence (1998)
Australia Capital 1.15-1.51 Benge (1999)
Bangladesh Sales 0.95-1.07
Devarajan, Thierfelder &
Suthiwart-Narueput (2002)
Bangladesh Import 1.17-2.18 Devarajan et al. (2002)
Cameroon Sales 0.48-0.96 Devarajan et al. (2002)
Cameroon Import 1.05-1.37 Devarajan et al. (2002)
Canada Commodity 1.25 Campbell (1975)
Canada Labour 1.38 Dahlby (1994)
Canada Labour 1.39-1.53 Fortin & Lacroix (1994)
China Sales 2.31 Laffont & Senik-Leygonie (1997)
India Excise 1.66-2.15 Ahmad & Stern (1987)
India Sales 1.59-2.12 Ahmad & Stern (1987)
India Import 1.54-2.17 Ahmad & Stern (1987)
Indonesia Sales 0.97-1.11 Devarajan et al. (2002)
Indonesia Import 0.99-1.18 Devarajan et al. (2002)
New Zealand Labour 1.18 Diewert & Lawrence (1994)
Sweden All taxes 1.69-2.29 Hansson & Stuart (1985)
United States All taxes 1.17-1.33 Ballard, Shoven & Whalley (1985)
United States Labour 1.21-1.24 Stuart (1984)
United States Labour 1.32-1.47 Browning (1987)
United States All taxes 1.47 Jorgenson & Yun (1990)
United States Labour 1.08-1.14 Ahmed & Croushore (1994)
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Finally, the attribution of some effects of public spending can also affect the
size of MCF estimates. Consider a marginal tax increase that increases revenue
by one dollar, before public spending occurs. Public spending could increase the
tax base in a second round effect (for example, building highways increases petrol
tax revenue). If this second round effect is attributed to the MCF, the increase in
revenue is greater than one dollar, and the MCF is accordingly reduced. But the
second round effect could equally well be attributed to a measure of the marginal
benefit of public spending. Mayshar (1991) proposed that all revenue effects of
public spending should be incorporated in the benefits measure (MBF), rather
than the MCF.
Fortunately, Schöb (1994) has shown that standard MCF measures provide a
valid basis for revenue-neutral tax reform, provided they are prepared using con-
sistent methodologies. The levels of MCF estimates will depend on the estimation
methodology, but these levels are not important in deciding directions for reform.
What is important is which tax instruments have high MCFs and which have low
MCFs. For our tax reform analysis, estimates of the MCF for different tax instru-
ments are prepared using common standard methodologies. By virtue of Schöb’s
(1994) result, the order of our estimates indicate priorities for the reform of African
tax structures.
3 The Model
Our model is formally set out in Appendix 1. Four goods are consumed in the
economy: untaxed (U ), domestic (D), imports (M ), and leisure (Z ).5 The rep-
resentative consumer has endowments of leisure (which may be converted into
labour), capital, and foreign exchange, which is used to purchase imports from the
rest of the world.6
On the production side of the economy, three final goods are produced in
the country: untaxed (U ), domestic (D), and exports (E ). Exports are used to
purchase foreign exchange (at a constant exchange rate), which is used to purchase
imports (M ) from the rest of the world. In addition investment (I ) is modeled
5Leisure is included only to permit robustness testing of the elasticity of labour supply. In
our base case, this elasticity is set to zero, and there is no leisure. Leisure differs from informal
labour in that it enters directly into the consumer’s welfare function, and is not used as an input
into production.
6The endowment of foreign exchange represents the trade balance. In Africa, this is financed
by borrowing and foreign aid. In a static model borrowing has no purpose, and the endowment
can be thought of as foreign aid.
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Figure 1: Utility and Production Functions
Utility Investment Domestic Exports Untaxed
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as an intermediate good, which is used as an input into each of domestic, exports,
and untaxed.
The production goods use four factors of production: formal capital (Kf ),
informal capital (Ki), formal labour (Lf ) and informal labour (Li).7 Taxation of
a fixed endowment will not alter its supply and so will not result in a deadweight
loss. Dividing factors into formal and informal introduces substitution possibilities,
and so permits the possibility of deadweight losses associated with factor taxation.
The inclusion of informal factors is thus critical for the estimation of factor MCFs.
It is assumed that production is competitive, so that all funds received by firms
are paid out to factors.
Nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions are used in all pro-
duction and utility functions. The structure of these functions is set out in Figure
1, with σ denoting elasticities of substitution between inputs, and τ denoting elas-
ticities of transformation between outputs.
The first panel in the diagram is the consumer’s utility function, where utility
(V ) is a function of leisure Z, and a consumption good C, and C is a compos-
ite good derived from a CES function of untaxed, domestic, and imports. The
endowment of time can be adjusted to determine the elasticity of labor supply.
7The informal good uses only informal capital and informal labour.
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The second panel illustrates the investment good CES function, combining
inputs of imports (MI) and domestically produced inputs (N). The treatment
of investment is driven by its role in the national accounts, where investment is
defined as capital goods with a life greater than one year. Some of these capital
goods are produced domestically, and some are imported. The model captures
a static snapshot of the ongoing process of capital accumulation, with long-lived
capital a necessary input into the production process: investment is itself an input
into the final good production functions.8 The domestically produced investment
inputs, N , consist of domestic and untaxed goods. Goods that are exported cannot
serve as an input.
The last three panels are the production functions for domestic, export and
untaxed. The top parts of domestic and untaxed production functions are con-
stant elasticity of transformation (CET) functions, where N is produced jointly
with the main good. We set these CET elasticities at 1 in our model, keeping pro-
duction of long-lived capital assets at a constant share of the value of total output.
The bottom parts of the three production function diagrams represent the nested
CES functions over the factors of production, including capital/labour substitu-
tion, and formal/informal substitution. These factors are in turn combined with
inputs of investment, in further CES functions, with elasticities σID, σIE, and σIU .
Although the production technology is the same, we separate production of
investment inputs, N , from production of domestic and untaxed goods to permit
different tax treatment. We apply a zero tax rate to domestically produced in-
vestment inputs. This corresponds to cases where investment inputs are produced
within the investing enterprise and so escape taxation, or where taxation permits
full deduction of the costs of business inputs. On the official side of the economy
taxes are thus imposed on domestic, exports, imports, formal capital, and formal
labour. There are no untaxed exports or imports. This is not meant to imply that
no smuggling occurs in African countries. Rather, the official figures for trade are
based on customs data, which typically reflects taxed goods. An implication is
that the untaxed good is produced and consumed purely domestically.
Tax revenue received by the Government is transferred lump-sum to consumers.
The experiment of increasing a distortionary tax rate and returning the revenue
lump-sum can be interpreted in terms of both ‘differential’ and ‘balanced-budget’
analysis. As emphasized in Section 2, for purposes of MCF estimates the realism
of the modeled public expenditure is not as important as the fact that a consistent
experiment is conducted across tax instruments.
8Use of final good outputs as inputs into an intermediate good is standard in static CGE
models, and can be considered to represent a long-run steady state (see Sue Wing (2004)).
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The data are given in Appendix 2. Country-specific data comprise values of
exports, imports, investment, and tax revenues for each of the five taxes, and legal
tax rates for domestic goods, capital and labour. These data were obtained from
IMF country report Statistical Annexes.
Data for tax revenue from sales of domestic are derived from tax revenues from
domestic VATs or sales taxes. Corporate income tax revenues are interpreted as
tax revenues from formal capital. Personal income tax revenues are equated with
revenues from formal labour. Data for tax revenues from exports and imports are
taken directly from the national accounts.
On average, in the countries that we examine, taxes on domestic goods, im-
ports, exports, personal income tax, and corporate income tax represent respec-
tively 20%, 38%, 2%, 13%, and 16% of tax revenue, with the remaining 11%
coming from other sources. Twenty countries in our sample do not use export
taxes. Among the eighteen countries that do use them, export taxes constitute 4%
of tax revenue. We ignore classes of tax revenue that do not fall into any of the
five tax revenue classes of the model. We assume that these other tax revenues
are unaffected by shocks to the model’s five tax rates, implicitly treating them as
lump-sum taxes.
The calibration process is described in Appendix 3. The sizes of the exports,
imports and investment are taken directly from the national accounts data. The
size of the domestic good is determined by dividing domestic tax revenues by
the legal tax rate. The size of the untaxed sector is the remainder of GDP after
domestic, exports, and goods taxes are accounted for. Formal factor payments are
similarly determined by dividing tax revenues by legal tax rates. Total payments
to informal factors are the residual of GDP after formal factors and investment are
accounted for, with their allocation between production goods and between capital
and labor determined in proportion to the production of the relevant formal goods
and factors, and for the untaxed good using an assumed labour-output ratio of
52%.9 Imports are separated into consumption and investment goods, reflecting
the ratio of consumption to investment in the national accounts. Domestic pro-
duction of investment inputs (N) is the national accounts figure for investment,
less imported investment goods.
Calibration of the model is completed with specification of the elasticities in
the utility and production functions. In our base case, we set all CES and CET
elasticities at unity.
Setting the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption at unity,
9The figure is based on data derived from five African countries, as indicated in Appendix 2.
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the elasticity of labour supply can be calibrated by changing the endowment of
time. In our base case we set this endowment to achieve a zero elasticity of labour
supply, and cover the possibility of positive elasticity in robustness testing.
We are unaware of estimates of the consumption function’s elasticity of sub-
stitution between our aggregate informal and taxed goods, but there is evidence
on the economy’s price elasticity of import demand (which includes demand for
both consumption and investment goods). Shocking the import price in our base
case model reveals an average price elasticity of import demand of -0.76. Emran &
Shilpi (2010) provide estimates for India and Sri Lanka in the range -0.71 to -0.82,
with a mean of -0.78, which supports our base case elasticities. Other evidence
suggests unitary import price elasticities (see, eg. Senhadji (1998)), and we deal
with this possibility in robustness testing of the model.
On the production side of the economy, Cobb-Douglas production functions,
with unitary elasticity of factor substitution, have long been a modeling workhorse,
and we have continued in this tradition. Tybout (2000) surveys the empirical
literature on production in developing countries, reporting returns to scale close to
unity in all industries covered by the literature, in India, Indonesia and Africa. This
evidence supports the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production. However, Chirinko
(2008) provides a survey which suggests that long-run elasticities of substitution
between capital and labour are in the range of 0.4 to 0.6 in OECD countries. We
deal with this possibility in robustness testing of the model, testing an elasticity
of 0.5.
4 MCF Estimates
We calculated the MCFs associated with six different shocks to tax rates. In
the first five experiments we increased each tax rate individually by adding one-
ten-thousandth of a percentage point to the existing tax rate (eg. from 10% to
10.0001%). The small increment is intended to capture the essence of a marginal
change to the tax rate. In the sixth experiment we increased all five tax rates
simultaneously by one-ten-thousandth of a percentage point.10 In each case the
additional tax revenue, ∆R, was redistributed to consumers as a lump sum trans-
fer. The new equilibrium was established using a computable general equilibrium
model written using GAMS MPSGE. The welfare change induced by the combined
tax and spend experiment was measured in terms of the numeraire using the equiv-
10In the sixth experiment, any zero export tax rates are left unchanged, under the assumption
that in these countries increased export taxes are not a policy option.
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alent variation, denoted EV (i.e., ∆W = −EV ) . The MCF of the experiment
was calculated as:
MCF =
EV
∆R
. (2)
4.1 Base Case Results
Our MCF estimates are presented in Table 2. In this and subsequent tables,
countries are ordered by MCF (All).11 On average, the MCF associated with
a marginal increase in all five tax instruments, MCF(All), is 1.21, indicating a
required rate of return of 21% for African public projects. Studying marginal
increase of specific tax instrument, the estimates provide a basic blueprint for tax
reform in each country. For any pair of tax instruments, the same total revenue
could be achieved for lower deadweight loss by lowering tax rates associated with
a high MCF and increasing low-MCF tax rates.
On average, taxes on the two taxed consumption goods (domestic and imports)
have low MCFs, while taxes on the two taxed factors (formal labour and formal
capital) have high MCFs.12 Looking at the lowest MCF in each country, the mean
is 1.087. On average, African countries could raise additional tax revenue with
an efficiency cost of just 8.7%. Outside of concessional donor funds, this is likely
to be among the cheapest potential sources of finance available in most African
countries.
The exports MCFs exhibit wide variation, to the point where the simple average
across countries yields little information. In seven cases, MCF(E) is negative,
because increasing the exports tax rate lowers total revenue (dR/dTE < 0).13
These cases can be grouped with high MCF values, in the sense that they indicate
that the exports tax is not an effective revenue-raising instrument. Examining
the 30 countries where (dR/dTE > 0), the average MCF (E) is 1.42. For the 15
11We could also have ordered them by GDP per capita. GDP per capita is negatively correlated
withMCF(All), but it leaves a large part of the variation unexplained, particularly for the poorest
countries. This is unsurprising, as all variables in the model interact to produce the MCF (All)
estimates. While there are not enough observations to perform meaningful statistical analysis of
the determinants of MCF(All), in section 5.2 we explore the role of informality.
12In 26 countries, the domestic tax has the lowest MCF, in 9 countries the lowest is the imports
tax, and in 3 countries it is the exports tax. In making this comparison we ignore cases where a
marginal increase in the export tax reduces total revenue, resulting in MCF(E)<0.
13 In Eritrea, a marginal increase in TE reduces tax revenue, but this in turn increases welfare,
resulting in 0 < MCF (E) < 1.
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Table 2: MCF Estimates
Country D M E L K All
Equatorial Guinea 1.34 1.03 1.01 1.27 1.20 1.05
Chad 1.09 1.05 1.02 1.26 1.18 1.06
Cameroon* 1.04 1.06 1.15 1.22 1.29 1.08
Congo, Rep.* 1.11 1.05 1.03 1.33 1.41 1.09
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1.08 1.07 1.11 1.30 1.60 1.10
Botswana* 0.95 1.24 1.19 1.18 1.22 1.10
Nigeria* 1.04 1.09 1.10 1.20 1.18 1.11
Mauritania* 1.06 1.08 1.14 1.31 1.31 1.11
Gabon 1.05 1.13 1.08 1.32 1.45 1.11
Togo* 1.07 1.09 1.16 1.47 1.58 1.12
Mozambique 1.14 1.06 1.11 1.35 1.54 1.12
South Africa* 1.08 1.15 -0.25 1.22 1.21 1.13
Madagascar* 1.14 1.12 1.22 1.33 1.62 1.15
Zambia* 1.13 1.09 1.48 1.23 1.58 1.16
Guinea 1.14 1.12 1.19 1.45 1.64 1.16
Guinea Bissau 1.08 1.12 1.20 1.22 1.71 1.17
Ghana 1.05 1.12 1.30 1.38 1.36 1.17
Gambia* 1.04 1.14 1.22 1.27 1.47 1.17
Cape Verde* 1.09 1.17 -1.59 1.51 1.26 1.17
Burundi 1.10 1.09 -0.37 1.74 1.57 1.18
Kenya* 1.11 1.16 1.42 1.32 1.44 1.18
Senegal* 1.08 1.19 1.50 1.48 1.70 1.19
Côte d’Ivoire 1.09 1.18 1.18 1.65 1.61 1.19
Namibia* 1.00 1.23 1.35 1.34 1.41 1.19
Eritrea* 1.15 1.13 0.58 1.99 1.65 1.21
Central African Rep. 1.17 1.13 1.37 1.79 1.62 1.22
Swaziland 0.87 1.19 1.26 1.36 1.54 1.23
Tanzania* 1.18 1.19 1.53 1.57 1.83 1.25
Malawi* 1.19 1.18 1.65 1.65 1.68 1.26
Burkina Faso* 1.17 1.23 -2.91 1.68 1.59 1.27
Ethiopia* 1.17 1.22 3.12 1.91 2.00 1.28
Mali 1.09 1.27 1.59 1.62 1.84 1.29
Sudan 1.09 1.25 2.01 1.73 1.86 1.29
Zimbabwe* 1.22 1.23 -0.06 1.50 1.71 1.31
Rwanda* 1.23 1.27 -0.33 2.28 2.47 1.37
Uganda 1.08 1.53 3.35 1.49 1.67 1.42
Niger 1.18 1.48 1.78 2.09 2.05 1.47
Benin 1.15 1.57 -1.24 2.55 2.55 1.72
Average 1.11 1.18 0.96 1.51 1.60 1.21
Maximum 1.34 1.57 3.35 2.55 2.55 1.72
Minimum 0.87 1.03 -2.91 1.18 1.18 1.05
Std. Dev. 0.08 0.12 1.13 0.32 0.31 0.13
* indicates countries with zero export taxes.
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countries with both strictly positive export tax rates and positive MCF(E), the
average MCF(E) is 1.54, but the maximum is 3.35 (Uganda) and the minimum
is 1.01 (Equatorial Guinea). The variability of MCF(E) can be understood by
noting that exports is an input into imports, so that the total tax on imports is
the product of both the exports and imports taxes.14
4.2 Robustness of Results
We tested the robustness of our MCF estimates to changes in various parameters,
focusing particularly on the elasticities of substitution in the demand and pro-
duction functions. The results of robustness testing are set out in Table 3. The
notation for the relevant elasticities is set out in Figure 1. For each experiment,
any unmentioned elasticity is the same as in our base case (that is, all CES and
CET function elasticities of substitution are 1, and the elasticity of labour supply
is 0).
In experiments 1-9 we lowered specific elasticities of substitution to values of
0.5, and in experiments 10-18 we increased the same elasticities to 2. In exper-
iments 6-9 and 15-18, changes in the consumer’s elasticity of substitution (σC)
between the three consumption goods (U , D, and M) resulted in large variation
of MCF(All), ranging from 1.11 to 1.53. Changes in production CES elasticities
resulted in little change in our base case estimates, with MCF(All) ranging from
1.19 to 1.24.
In experiments 19 and 20 we also tested the possibility of positive elasticity of
labor supply, notwithstanding evidence from developed countries that the elasticity
is zero.15 A small labor supply elasticity of 0.05 induced a negligible change in our
estimated MCFs. An implausibly large elasticity of labour supply of 1.0 increased
average MCF (All) to 1.27, and increased average MCF (L) to 1.75 (compared
with 1.51 in the base case).
Our choice of marginal tax rate for labour was in places arbitrary, choosing
from multiple rates in personal income tax schedules. In experiments 21 and 22
we tested the effect of increasing and decreasing the marginal labour tax rate by
5 percentage points. The resulting average MCF (L) values were 1.60 and 1.43.
Other MCF estimates were little changed.
A check on the reasonableness of each experiment’s parameter changes is pro-
vided in the column listing the absolute value of the resulting elasticity of import
14The level of import tariffs appears to have a stronger influence on MCF(E) than the export
tax rate. Among the 15 countries with strictly positive export taxes and positive MCF(E), linear
regression of MCF(E) on the import tariff gaveMCF (E) = 0.7+0.044TM with R2 = 0.58, while
regression on the export tax rate gave MCF (E) = 1.5− 0.02TE , with R2 = 0.004.
15The elasticity of labor supply is varied by changing the endowment of time, while keeping
constant the consumer’s CES elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption goods
(σW = 1).
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Table 3: Sensitivity Testing
Experiment D M E L K All M (1) (2) (3)
1 σD = σE = σU = 0.5 1.10 1.17 0.96 1.52 1.59 1.20 0.76 38 35 38
2 σKD = σLD = σKE = σLE = 0.5 1.11 1.18 0.97 1.36 1.40 1.19 0.76 28 20 27
3 σD, σE , σU , σKD , σLD, σKE , σLE = 0.5 1.10 1.17 0.96 1.37 1.40 1.19 0.76 28 18 27
4 σLD = σLE = 0.5 1.11 1.18 0.97 1.36 1.59 1.20 0.76 31 19 33
5 σI = 0.5 1.11 1.15 0.72 1.50 1.58 1.19 0.67 33 30 36
6 σC = 0.5 1.04 1.11 0.77 1.32 1.40 1.12 0.51 25 21 31
7 σI = σC = 0.5 1.05 1.08 1.76 1.28 1.38 1.11 0.42 33 29 34
8 σC = σD = σE = σU = 0.5 1.04 1.11 0.76 1.33 1.40 1.12 0.51 25 21 31
9 σI = σC = σD = σE = σU = 0.5 1.05 1.08 1.74 1.28 1.38 1.11 0.42 33 29 34
10 σD = σE = σU = 2 1.11 1.18 0.97 1.50 1.59 1.21 0.76 35 35 37
11 σKD = σLD = σKE = σLE = 2 1.11 1.18 0.97 1.99 2.29 1.24 0.76 33 29 34
12 σD, σE , σU , σKD , σLD, σKE , σLE = 2 1.11 1.18 0.97 1.98 2.29 1.24 0.76 32 28 34
13 σLD = σLE = 2 1.11 1.18 0.97 1.99 1.59 1.22 0.76 20 16 31
14 σI = 2 1.10 1.23 1.31 1.57 1.67 1.24 0.91 30 24 31
15 σC = 2 1.26 1.37 0.99 3.18 3.50 1.44 1.24 30 24 31
16 σI = σC = 2 1.25 1.49 1.83 1.08 2.05 1.52 1.42 27 20 31
17 σC = σD = σE = σU = 2 1.27 1.37 1.08 2.94 3.67 1.45 1.24 30 24 29
18 σI = σC = σD = σE = σU = 2 1.26 1.49 14.42 173.32 12.53 1.53 1.43 31 26 31
19 labor supply elasticity=0.05 1.11 1.18 0.98 1.53 1.59 1.21 0.77 27 16 26
20 labor supply elasticity=1 1.16 1.23 1.19 1.75 1.61 1.27 0.87 37 35 37
21 TL + 0.05 1.11 1.18 1.05 1.60 1.60 1.21 0.76 26 19 27
22 TL − 0.05 1.10 1.17 0.83 1.43 1.59 1.20 0.76 36 29 34
23 σI = σC = 1.367 1.16 1.26 2.29 1.74 1.86 1.29 1.00 29 25 28
24 σI = σC = 1.375; 1.15 1.26 2.51 1.56 1.62 1.27 1.00 34 31 34
σD, σE , σU , σ
K
D , σ
L
D, σ
K
E , σ
L
E = 0.5
Columns D, E, M, K, L, and All report average MCFs for the 38 countries. Column M reports
the average elasticity of import demand resulting from the assumed elasticities of substitution.
Columns (1), (2) and (3) indicate the number of countries that give recommendations for tax
reform that are ‘close’ to those of the base case, in the following senses. In column (1) the tax
instruments found to have the highest and lowest MCFs are the same as in the base case. In
column (2) all five individual MCFs are ranked in the same order as in the base case. In column
(3) at most one pairwise comparison of MCFs gives a different recommendation from the base
case estimates.
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demand (M). Emran & Shilpi (2010) find that a mean estimate of M is 0.78, and
our base case is close to this (0.76). However, Senhadji (1998) suggests M = 1.
We calibrated the model to achieve average M = 1 by varying σC and σI , in ex-
periments 23 and 24. Assuming values of 0.76 ≤ M ≤ 1.00, a reasonable range for
estimates of MCF (All) is 1.19 to 1.29, with our preferred estimates in the range
1.19 to 1.21.
For partial revenue-neutral tax reform, it is the ordering of MCF estimates
that is important, not their magnitudes. For such reform, the aim is to compare
two tax instruments, increase the tax rate on the low MCF tax, and decrease
the tax rate on the high MCF tax. Table 3 reports the number of countries in
which the ordering of MCFs is robust to changes in parameters. Three measures
of robustness are used. The first measure supposes that reform is concentrated on
the most extreme MCFs. The two tax instruments with the highest and lowest
MCFs are identified. If these two instruments are the same as in the base case,
the ordering is considered robust. Among the five tax instruments there are ten
pairwise comparisons that are possible, identifying for each pair the high and
low MCF instruments. The second measure of robustness requires that all ten
such comparisons report the same pairwise ordering. This implies that all five
instruments follow the same order as in the base case. The third measure of
robustness permits just one pairwise comparison to give a different ordering from
the base case.
On the basis of the first measure the ordering of MCF estimates was robust
to variations in parameters on average in 30 out of 38 countries with a minimum
of 20. The ordering of MCFs was fully robust to the tested parameter changes on
average in 25 countries with a minimum of 16. And on average in 31 countries,
the ordering of MCFs was unchanged for 9 out of 10 pairwise comparisons, with
a minimum of 26 countries. These results suggest that the MCF orders implied
by the base case are reasonably robust to changes in the parameters. It remains
that for any particular revenue-neutral reform it would be necessary to examine
the results for the country in question.
4.3 Costs of Tax Administration
One of the features of taxation in Africa is relatively high administrative costs.
Table 4 provides an international comparison of administrative costs, measured
by dividing the expenses of tax collection agencies by the revenue collected. The
average for rich countries is 1.36%, 1.88% for Latin American countries, and 2.35%
for African countries.16
A taxpayer paying a dollar of taxes suffers the same loss of utility regardless of
16Not all of the tax agencies represented in these figures collect all types of taxes. Since the
collection costs vary by tax type, this may give a distorted impression of some agencies efficiency.
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Table 4: Tax Administration Costs
Country Year(s) Cost/Collections
Australia 2001-2002 1.2%
Canada 2001-2002 2.3%
New Zealand 2001-2002 1.2%
UK 2001-2002 1.6%
US 2002 0.5%
Guatemala 1999-2001 1.9%
Mexico 1995, 1997-98 1.7%
Peru 1996-1998 1.9%
Venezuela 1995-1998 2.0%
Ghana 1993 2.8%
Kenya 1995-2000 1.2%
Namibia 2001-2002 1.3%
South Africa 1998-2001 1.1%
Tanzania 1996-1997 3.0%
Uganda 1991-2000 3.6%
The cost/collections ratio reports the annual cost of tax collection agencies divided by the
amount of money collected. For data sources, see Appendix 2.
whether the administration has paid 2 cents or 50 cents to enforce the collection.
Further, the administration costs are not lost to society. They are paid to civil
servants and other providers of goods and services. Thus, tax administration costs
do not alter EV in our MCF formula (2).17 Administration costs do, however,
alter ∆R, by reducing the net revenue available for government spending. If we
suppose that administration costs constitute µ% of tax revenue collected, a tax
shock that changes gross revenue by ∆R changes net revenue by ∆R(1 − µ)%.
Incorporating administrative costs in our MCF estimates is thus a simple matter
of multiplying our existing estimates by 1
1−µ .
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Table 4 indicates that on average µ = 2.35% in Africa. On this evidence, our
base case results should be multiplied by 1.024. Table 5 reports the average MCFs
from Table 2 adjusted for administrative costs, assuming that those costs are the
same for all tax instruments. Although Africa has more costly tax administrations
than other regions, this alone is unlikely to result in substantially higher marginal
costs of public funds.
If administrative costs of tax instruments differ, they could alter the MCF
rankings. One of the arguments against the introduction of VATs, for example,
is their high administrative cost.19 Assuming that the taxes on imports, labour,
17We treat as negligibly small the marginal change in consumer surplus forgone on goods that
could have been produced using the factors of production involved in tax administration.
18See Ahmad & Stern (1987), Slemrod & Yitzhaki (1996).
19Munk (2008) shows that the level of administrative costs has a bearing on the optimality of
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Table 5: Average MCFs Incorporating Administration Costs
Domestic Imports Exports Labour Capital All
1.13 1.20 0.99 1.55 1.63 1.23
Assumes administrative costs are identical for all taxes (2.35% of revenue).
and capital have administrative costs of 2.35%, the adjusted MCF for domestic
taxation would exceed the adjusted MCFs for imports, labour, and capital, on
average, if the administrative cost of domestic taxation exceeded the following
thresholds: 8% for imports, 28% for labour, and 32% for capital.20 That is,
almost one-third of the revenue from a VAT could be consumed in administration
cost before its adjusted MCF would exceed the adjusted MCF of the corporate
income tax. These are wide margins, and help to explain why 30 countries in
our sample have introduced VATs, notwithstanding the administrative costs they
impose on the economy.
5 Tax Reform
The two most basic topics of tax reform are the structure of existing tax rates, and
the bases on which taxes are levied. Our model can be applied to shed light on
recent reforms of tax structures, and to suggest the level of resources which should
be devoted to extending existing taxes into the informal economy.
5.1 Reforming Tax Structures
We noted in the introduction that African economies have in recent years been
reducing trade taxes, and introducing VATs. Piggott & Whalley (2001), Emran
& Stiglitz (2005), and Munk (2008) illustrate cases where in the presence of an
informal sector, elimination of trade taxes and their replacement with a VAT
reduces welfare. To assess the strength of such effects in the African context, we
derived optimal taxes to achieve each country’s existing revenue. Starting from
zero tax rates for all five taxes, we iteratively and incrementally increased the tax
with the lowest MCF until the revenue target was achieved.21 The resulting tax
structures are set out in Table 6.
In all countries, optimal taxation includes a tax on domestic, and a tax on one
of either imports or exports. The mutual exclusivity of optimal taxes on imports
border taxes, in the presence of an informal sector.
20And dealing with the average MCF for exports in countries where MCF(E)>0, the threshold
would be 23%
21We did not increase taxes when doing so would lower total revenue (ie dR/dt < 0). We
conducted several iterations of tax-raising, starting with zero factor taxes and rates of goods
taxation that were progressively higher but still less than required to generate the revenue target.
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Table 6: Optimal Tax Structures
tD tM tE tL tK Optimal ∆W (1) ∆W (2) η
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) MCF (%) (%) (%)
Equatorial Guinea 7.8 0 9.9 0.2 5.6 1.04 4.6 5.9 79
Chad 3.8 0 6.9 0.3 0.9 1.02 0.9 1.0 92
Cameroon 19.4 20.2 0 3.2 3.3 1.05 0.5 1.0 51
Congo, Rep. 9.6 0 9.6 2.1 2.0 1.03 1.0 1.3 80
Congo, Dem. Rep. 13.1 14.1 0 0 0 1.07 0.3 0.5 48
Botswana 20.5 0 17.2 3.7 3.9 1.04 1.9 2.6 74
Nigeria 17.1 0 19.2 0 4.3 1.06 0.7 1.3 51
Mauritania 18.9 18.6 0 0.9 0.7 1.07 0.5 1.1 46
Gabon 14.2 0 16.7 4.6 5.6 1.04 1.4 1.9 70
Togo 19.0 21.7 0 0 0 1.09 0.4 0.9 40
Mozambique 14.8 15.6 0 0 0 1.08 0.4 0.8 54
South Africa 28.4 32.5 0 0 0 1.08 0.8 1.8 3
Madagascar 18.4 19.6 0 0 0 1.12 0.3 0.9 29
Zambia 22.8 24.1 0 0 0 1.10 0.7 1.5 48
Guinea 17.2 19.7 0 0 0 1.12 0.2 0.7 34
Guinea Bissau 16.8 18.9 0 0 0 1.10 0.4 0.9 48
Ghana 21.0 21.1 0 0 0 1.08 0.8 1.5 51
Gambia 24.6 27.3 0 1.0 0 1.13 0.6 1.9 34
Cape Verde 24 23.1 0 0 0 1.10 0.7 1.8 42
Burundi 18.0 20.6 0 0 0 1.07 0.7 1.2 61
Kenya 24.6 29.2 0 0 0 1.12 0.7 1.7 39
Senegal 25.5 28.5 0 0 0 1.13 0.8 2.0 41
Côte d’Ivoire 19.3 0 28.6 0 0 1.08 1.1 1.9 56
Namibia 30.0 0 37.1 3.3 0 1.09 1.9 4.0 47
Eritrea 16.3 17.4 0 0 0 1.07 1.0 1.4 72
Central African Rep. 16.9 19.7 0 0 0 1.12 0.4 0.8 50
Swaziland 30.7 0 44.3 1.3 0 1.07 2.0 4.2 47
Tanzania 22.4 26.3 0 0 0 1.16 0.5 1.3 38
Malawi 22.0 26.8 0 0 0 1.13 1.0 1.8 54
Burkina Faso 22.0 25.9 0 0 0 1.17 0.5 1.3 39
Ethiopia 20.5 23.1 0 0 0 1.16 0.7 1.4 49
Mali 26.4 31.0 0 0 0 1.17 0.8 2.2 39
Sudan 18.5 21.3 0 0 0 1.15 0.4 0.8 48
Zimbabwe 25.6 32.9 0 0 0 1.15 1.2 2.3 53
Rwanda 22.8 26.8 0 0 0 1.17 1.2 2.0 57
Uganda 28.1 0 47.0 0 0 1.20 1.2 3.0 40
Niger 25.2 0 42.5 0 0 1.21 0.9 2.4 39
Benin 31.7 41.4 0 0 0 1.27 1.8 3.7 49
Average 20.5 23.8 23.4 2.3 3.0 1.11 0.9 1.8 51
Averages of tax rates are calculated using only non-zero tax rates.
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and exports can be understood by noting that in our model the trade balance is
fixed, so that by Lerner (1936) symmetry, an ad valorem tax on either imports or
exports reduces both, in equal proportions. The effect of an exports tax on the
quantity of exports could be reproduced with a VAT applied to both domestic
and imported goods, combined with an appropriately calibrated additional import
tariff. But where the taxes are levied makes a difference to the marginal cost of
public funds.22 Accordingly, depending on the elasticities of the entire general
equilibrium system, exports taxes may be required for optimal taxation.
The presence of significant optimal trade taxes appears to validate criticisms
of general policies of lowering trade taxes. As Keen (2008) stresses, the VAT also
applies to imported goods. The import tariff can be interpreted as a supplementary
consumption tax applying only to imports. For countries with strictly positive
optimal imports taxes, the optimal tax rates average 21.2% for domestic, and
24.0% for imports : suggesting an average optimal tariff of 2.8 percentage points
applying in addition to an average optimal VAT of 21.2 percentage points. That is,
the average optimal tariff is small, but positive. In practice, for the same countries,
the actual tax rates from our data table average 16.4% for domestic and 16.1% for
imports : imported goods are taxed at lower average rates than domestic goods.
Unlike imports taxes, a VAT does not serve as a replacement for an optimal
export tax. In particular, exports are frequently zero-rated, meaning that no VAT
is paid on sales, but credit is given for tax paid on inputs. In the 11 countries where
optimal taxation recommends positive exports taxes, welfare would be reduced by
the elimination of exports taxes combined with revenue-neutral increases in the
VAT, confirming the point made by Emran & Stiglitz (2005).23 The importance of
this result can be measured. We calculated welfare under optimal taxes in the 11
countries, and then recalculated optimal taxes under the constraint of zero taxes
on exports. Unconstrained, a movement from existing tax structures to optimal
taxes increases welfare by an average of 1.61% across the 11 countries. With the
constraint of zero export taxes, the welfare gain is 1.03%.
Summarizing these findings, in most countries an optimal structure would in-
clude a VAT, a small imports tariff, and a zero exports tax. But there are some
countries where taxes on imports should be zero (including a zero VAT for im-
ports), and exports taxes should be relatively large.
Several further observations follow from our calculation of optimal taxes. The
presence of factor taxes in 11 countries contrasts with the common belief that these
taxes play no efficiency role in optimal taxation, and should be included in the tax
system only to address equity goals. In conjunction with optimal taxes on exports,
the results serve as a reminder that the Diamond & Mirrlees (1971) production
22For example, in Niger, with optimal tax rates of TD = 25.2%, TE = 42.5%, and TM = 0%,
the corresponding costs of funds are MCF (D) = 1.21, MCF (E) = 1.21, and MCF (M) = 1.39.
23The average rate of taxes on exports in these 11 countries is 1.3% in our data, much lower
than the average 23.4% recommended by optimal taxation.
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efficiency result (ie. optimal taxes should be levied only on final goods, and not
on inputs) does not necessarily hold when not all final goods can be taxed (see,
for example, Dasgupta & Stiglitz (1974)). The optimality of factor taxes may be
related to the size of the informal sector. The untaxed good represents an average
of 28% of GDP in countries where optimal factor taxes are strictly positive, and
7% of GDP in countries where optimal factor tax rates are zero.
Moving to optimal taxes results in a single MCF for all non-zero taxes. Across
the 38 countries, the average of these optimal MCFs is 1.11, much lower than the
average MCF(All)=1.21 reported in Table 2. A lower cost of public funds would
permit a wider range of public projects. These additional public projects could,
in a dynamic setting, augment the static gains reported here.
We define three measures of the potential benefits of reform: ∆W (1) is the wel-
fare improvement resulting from a revenue-neutral move from existing tax struc-
tures to optimal tax structures, measured as a percentage of the consumer’s initial
level of income; ∆W (2) is the welfare improvement resulting from the elimination
of all taxes; and η = ∆W (1)
∆W (2)
× 100 reports the first measure as a proportion of
the second, reflecting the relative importance of the revenue target and the tax
structure in terms of efficiency cost. On average, ∆W (1) = 0.9%, ∆W (2) = 1.8%,
and η = 51%: reforming tax structures would achieve just over half of the gains
of entirely eliminating distorting taxes. There is, however, wide variation in the
potential impact of revenue-neutral reform of tax structures: η ranges from a mini-
mum of 34% to a maximum of 92%, with higher values indicating greater potential
benefits. Reform of tax structures should be on the reform agenda in countries
with high η.
5.2 Expanding the Tax Base
Perhaps the key distinguishing feature of African tax systems is the importance
of the informal sector. At the heart of the dead-weight loss of taxation is the
substitution effect. This effect is presumably greater when it is easier to escape
taxation. This suggests that economies with large informal sectors are likely to
have high MCFs associated with their existing taxes. Figure 2 plots our base case
estimates of MCF (All) against the calibrated value of untaxed, suggesting the
strength of this intuition. The Figure holds out the prospect that expanding the
tax base to include currently untaxed sectors could lower the MCFs of existing
taxes and offers the potential for additional revenue at low marginal cost: all else
equal, economic activities that are more lightly taxed than others will have lower
MCFs.
Pursuing these notions, we calculated the MCFs associated with different parts
of the informal sector. The results of these experiments are reported in Table 12 in
the Appendix. Marginal taxes were imposed on: production of the untaxed good
(U); informal capital used anywhere in the economy (Ki); informal capital used
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Figure 2: MCF(All) as a Function of the Value of the Untaxed Good
to produce domestic or export goods (KiDE); informal labour used anywhere in
the economy (Li); and informal labour used to produce domestic or export goods
(LiDE). We distinguished between taxing a factor wherever it is used and taxing
a factor when it is used to produce domestic or export goods because the latter
seems more plausible. It seems more likely that the administration will be able
to tax a firm’s accounting profits (returns to capital) and labour inputs in cases
where the firm’s output is already taxed.24
The average MCF values for the new tax instruments are reported in the last
line (MCF i) of Table 7. Among the different instruments for taxing the informal
sectors, the least cost way of raising money is by increasing taxes on untaxed
goods. The average MCF (U) is 0.85, lower than the average MCF elsewhere
in the informal economy.25 But governments may hesitate to increase taxes of
informal goods if they care about distributional issues and poor households are
concentrated in production of untaxed goods or they consume a lot of untaxed
24This is a second best policy. When taxation of informal factors is restricted to inputs to
domestic and export goods, the MCF is higher than when informal factors are taxed wherever
they are used: MCF (KiDE) > MCF (K
i) and MCF (LiDE) > MCF (L
i).
25In all countries the MCF of a tax on the untaxed good is less than 1 (see Table 12). The
negative welfare shock suffered by households (before the revenue is returned lump-sum) is smaller
than the increase in government revenue. Once lump-sum redistribution of the revenue occurs,
households are better off than before the tax shock. Increasing taxes in the informal sector helps
to counteract existing taxes in other sectors.
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goods.
When distributional issues are considered, a promising part of the untaxed
economy is informal capital used to produce taxed goods: average MCF (KiDE)
is 0.9. That is, imposing taxes on companies that produce taxed goods but do
not pay company tax generally offers a lower cost of public funds than increasing
existing taxes elsewhere in the formal economy. In many cases such companies have
legal tax exemptions, which can be removed with low administrative expense.26
Removing such exemptions has the potential for a low marginal cost of taxation,
without obvious major effects on the poorest households.
Finally, we calculated the threshold levels of administrative costs for taxes
in the informal sector, as a proportion of revenue raised. Table 7 reports the
thresholds at which the average MCFs of informal sector taxes from Table 12
adjusted to include administration costs, would be equal to our average base case
formal sector MCFs (Table 2) adjusted to include uniform 2.35% administration
costs.27
Policy-makers considering a reform which would extend taxation into an un-
taxed sector could compare the estimated administrative costs of the new tax
against these thresholds. For example, extending the VAT (tax on domestic) to
a currently exempt firm’s sales (U), the relevant administrative cost threshold is
25% of the revenue raised. If it costs $600 to bring the firm into the tax system,
the revenue generated should be at least $2400. If the VAT has a 15% rate, and
value-added represents 35% of sales, then the appropriate threshold for application
of the VAT is sales greater than 2400
0.35×0.15 = $45, 714.
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6 Conclusion
Our results suggest that there is potential for increasing African tax revenue at
relatively low social cost. If tax revenue is held constant, there is much scope for
reforming the structure of taxes to lower their social cost. Moving into the details
26In a survey of 197 businesses in Cameroon, Gauthier & Gersovitz (1997) report that 4 were
legally exempt from sales tax, while 30 were legally exempt from the business profits tax. In
Gauthier & Reinikka (2006) a similar survey of 158 businesses in Uganda reports 17 exemptions
from sales tax and 41 exemptions from the corporate income tax. Both studies found that
exemptions tended to be granted to large firms, while smaller firms were more likely to evade
tax illegally. Legal tax exemptions may be the result of corruption. Fjeldstad (2003) reports
that in the mid 1990s senior Tanzanian officials accepted bribes in return for tax exemptions:
“within the Ministry of Finance, the Revenue Department went under the nickname of the ‘Tax
Exemption Department.’ ”
27The exports MCF used is the average only for countries for whichMCF (E) > 0 and existing
exports taxes are non-zero.
28The example is a modified version of an example given by Keen & Mintz (2004), who use a
different methodology and different assumption concerning the benchmark MCF to find a VAT
threshold of $40,000.
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Table 7: Administrative Cost Thresholds for Informal Taxes
U Ki KiDE L
i LiDE MCF
f
Domestic 0.25 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.08 1.11
Imports 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.13 1.18
Exports 0.40 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.27 1.40
Labour 0.45 0.43 0.42 0.42 0.33 1.51
Capital 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.45 0.36 1.60
All 0.31 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.16 1.21
MCF i 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.90 1.04
of tax reform, our results shed light on a series of issues in African tax policy.
First, low MCF estimates suggest there is scope for increasing total tax rev-
enue in most African countries. We find little evidence to suggest that African
taxation is more costly than in other regions. Plausible parameter values suggest
a range of 1.19 to 1.29 for MCF(All), associated with raising taxes on all five
taxes simultaneously. While comparison with MCF estimates produced using dif-
ferent methodologies is problematic, these estimates are well within the range of
other studies given in Table 1.29 Our preferred estimates in robustness testing of
MCF(All) are in the range of 1.19 to 1.21, suggesting low average MCFs in Africa.
Focusing on the lowest MCF tax instrument in each country, the average MCF in
our base case estimates is 1.087. This is likely to be one of the lowest cost sources
of finance available for many African countries, and suggests scope for increasing
total revenue levels by increasing these particular taxes. Another approach to the
issue is to look at the MCF associated with optimal taxation, in Table 6. If an
acceptable marginal cost of public funds is, say, 1.15, then in 28 of the 38 countries
there is scope for increasing tax revenues linked to reform of tax structures.
Second, our estimates provide support for the emphasis that reformers have
placed on VATs, with low MCFs indicating the efficiency of taxes on domestic and
imported goods. In our dataset, 30 countries have implemented VATs. This has
been part of a global tax reform wave over the past twenty years, documented
in Ebrill, Keen, Bodin & Summers (2002). Average MCF(D) is 1.11 and average
MCF(M) is 1.18.
Benefits of VATs include the elimination of cascading of multiple sales taxes,
and a tendency to broaden the tax base through VAT reporting requirements.
Cascading of taxes raises the average and marginal tax rates applied to goods
that go through multiple intermediate steps in the production chain, so we would
29It is beyond the scope of this paper to estimate the MCF in rich countries to provide directly
comparable results. There are several difficulties in adapting our model to rich countries. For
example, the European customs union must be modelled to examine import tariffs, and in the
United States, state level taxes complicate the analysis. Social security taxes also need to be
taken into account. These difficulties are not insurmountable, but we leave them for future
research.
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expect the introduction of VATs to have lowered average MCFs. And bringing
untaxed goods into the tax base is associated with a very low average MCF(U) of
0.85, indicating that it actually increases welfare.
One of the concerns in the introduction of VATs is the administrative cost
involved. In very poor countries, these administrative costs could be large relative
to the revenue raised. We find, however, that there is typically a wide margin for
implementation. On average, in order for the marginal cost of a VAT to exceed
the marginal cost of other taxes, the VAT’s administrative costs would need to
exceed at least 23% of the revenue raised, compared with African evidence that
the costs of administering existing taxes are less than 2.4%.
Third, our results suggest that from a static welfare perspective, Africa has
perhaps reached the limits of the process of lowering import tariffs. In our model,
optimal taxation suggests that in most countries a small positive imports tariff
should be applied in addition to a VAT that applies to all domestic and imported
goods. In practice, these same countries tax imports on average at a lower rate
than domestic goods. Having regard to these results, any argument for further
lowering of tariffs would need to be made on the basis of potential dynamic gains
from increased trade exposure, which are not addressed in our model. Moving
away from the ideal of optimal taxation, the average MCF(M) associated with
imports taxes is, at 1.18, the second-lowest average MCF30 suggesting that it is a
candidate for potential increase if additional revenue is sought.
Fourth, our model does not support a general conclusion of zero rates of export
tax. In our sample data, 21 countries have eliminated export taxes entirely, and
the average exports tax rate in the remaining 17 countries is 1.6%. There appears
to be a growing consensus that export taxes are inappropriate. But our MCF
results reveal widely varying values of MCF(E), sometimes very low, sometimes
very high, and sometimes the instrument performs so poorly that it reduces total
revenue resulting in a negative MCF(E). The variability of MCF(E) carries over
into the optimal tax rates, where it is optimal to have either an imports tax or
an exports tax, but never both. There are 12 countries for which strictly positive
export taxes are optimal, of which 5 currently have zero export taxes. Where
export taxes are optimal, our results suggest that replacing them with consumption
taxes would induce an average welfare loss of around 0.5% (measured in terms
of the equivalent variation in the consumer’s income). These findings suggest
that caution is warranted in reducing export tariffs in countries where MCF(E) is
positive but small.
Fifth, estimates of the MCF in informal sectors provide guidance concerning
the social cost of tax exemptions. Some African countries have offered tax ex-
emptions to large companies with the aim of encouraging investment. Our MCF
estimates suggest the cost of such policies. The corporate income tax, for ex-
ample, is typically associated with a high MCF (average MCF (K) = 1.6). But
30Excluding negative MCF(E) for which dR/dTE < 0.
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there is a low MCF associated with the imposition of a marginal tax on companies
that produce taxed goods but are exempt from the corporate income tax (average
MCF (KiDE) = 0.9). The removal of exemptions from goods taxation has an even
lower marginal cost (average MCF(U)=0.85), and from an efficiency point of view
should be the first priority when consideration turns to increasing revenue.
Sixth, our MCF estimates provide guidance for reformers about the level of
resources that should be devoted to extending taxes into informal sectors. Large
informal sectors are associated with high MCFs in the formal economy. Expand-
ing the tax base will help to lower the cost of public funds. While there may be
equity concerns associated with taxing some parts of the informal economy, the
existence of MCFs less than one in the informal economy suggests scope for in-
creasing welfare and tax revenue simultaneously. In turn, higher welfare and tax
revenue suggest the possibility of compensating the losers from tax base expan-
sion. For example, efforts to tax informal agriculture could be accompanied by
increased roads maintenance in rural areas. Measures to bring currently informal
activities within the tax base would be justified even if a large proportion of the
additional revenue were consumed in enforcement and administration (eg 25% or
more in the case of currently untaxed goods). Non-tax measures to reduce the in-
formal economy could also be effective tools in improving the efficiency of the tax
system. Auriol & Warlters (2005) suggest that governments could substantially
reduce the size of their informal sectors by reducing red tape barriers to business
entry into the formal sector. Such a policy would not only help to enhance revenue
by enlarging the tax base, but would also reduce the marginal cost of public funds.
Finally, we find that corporate and personal income taxes have high average
MCFs, suggesting that they should be reduced. In our data, average corporate tax
rates (33%) and MCF(K)= 1.6 are slightly higher than average personal income tax
rates (27%) and MCF(L) = 1.51. The role of factor taxes is sometimes understood
in terms of equity objectives, with progressive personal income tax serving a purely
distributional purpose, and the corporate income tax serving as a backstop to
prevent easy avoidance of the personal income tax. It is thus interesting to note
that instances of strictly positive factor taxes occur under optimal taxation in our
model, and that this appears to be related to the size of the informal sector.
It remains to note the scope for extensions of our model. A priority is explicit
treatment of corruption. If a firm costlessly fails to report, or under-reports, eco-
nomic activity, that activity becomes part of the informal economy in our model,
and the general equilibrium effects are the same as for legal exemptions. But if
the firm incurs costs in tax evasion, for example by paying a bribe to a tax offi-
cial, those costs may have effects in static general equilibrium which are similar to
paying the tax, albeit with the "revenue" flowing differently than the government
would have directed. In this case the static general equilibrium effects are the same
as for higher administrative costs. An extension of our model could incorporate
estimates of the proportion of firms’ revenues devoted to bribery or other forms of
tax avoidance.
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To address this and other issues, we are making our CGE model available
on the editor’s website. We hope that the model can be more widely applied to
generate insights into the tax systems of additional countries. The model runs on
the free demonstration version of the GAMS software.
27
APPENDIX 1: Model Specification
The single representative consumer maximizes a CES utility function with four
goods: leisure (Z ), untaxed (U ), domestic (D), and imports (MC) subject to the
income constraint.
Max V = V (Z,U,D,MC) subject to PLZ + p˜uU + P˜DD + P˜MM ≤ Y
A tilde over a price indicates that it is tax-inclusive:
P˜j = (1 + Tj)Pj,∀j ∈ {D,E,M, I,N,KfD, KfE, LfD, LfE}
Consumer income is the value of the endowments of foreign exchange (a¯), time
(T¯ ), and capital (K¯) plus the transfer received from the government (R).
Y = a¯+ PLT¯ + PKK¯ +R
Leisure plus labour supply equals the time endowment.
Z + L = T¯
The consumer’s first order conditions are:
∂V/∂Z
PL
=
∂V/∂U
P˜U
=
∂V/∂D
P˜D
=
∂V/∂M
P˜M
Factors and investment are combined by CES production functions to produce
intermediate goods for untaxed (ψU), domestic (ψD), and a final good exports
(ψE). The factors used are capital and labour, each of which may be formal
(taxed) or informal (untaxed). The notation for factors is sqr : the amount of
factor s ∈ {K,L} used to produce good r ∈ {U,D,E}, where q ∈ {i, f} indicates
whether the factor is informal or formal.
ψU = γU(K
i
U , L
i
U , IU)
ψD = γD(K
i
D, K
f
D, L
i
D, L
f
D, ID)
XE = γE(K
i
E, K
f
E, L
i
E, L
f
E, IE)
The first order conditions determining factor usage in production, investment usage
in production, and investment inputs in production are given by:
∂ψr
∂sqr
=
P˜sqr
Pr
∂I
∂N
=
P˜N
PI
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∂ψI
∂x
=
P˜x
PI
, forx ∈ {M,N}
Investment inputs are combined to produce investment:
I = ψE(M,N)
The intermediate goods are divided between final goods and investment inputs
using CET production functions.
ψU = δU(XU , NU)
ψD = δD(XD, ND)
The value of imports is equal to the value of exports plus the endowment of
foreign exchange.
P˜MXM = P˜EXE + A¯
Factor demand equals factor supply:
KiU +K
i
D +K
i
E +K
f
D +K
f
E = K¯
LiU + L
i
D + L
i
E + L
f
D + L
f
E = L
Factors receive the same after-tax return wherever employed:
Psqr = Ps,∀s ∈ {K,L},∀q ∈ {i, f},∀r ∈ {U,D,E}
Taxes are zero for the informal good, informal factors, domestically produced
investment inputs, and investment:
Tj = 0 ∀j ∈ {U, {sir}, N, I},∀s ∈ {K,L},∀r ∈ {U,D,E}.
Formal factors face the same tax rates whether producing exports or formal
goods. This permits simpler notation:
TK ≡ TKfr , TL ≡ TLfr ,∀r ∈ {D,E}
The numeraire is foreign exchange:
PwM = 1
Goods supply equals demand.
XU = U
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XD = D
XM =M =MC +MI
IU + ID + IE = I
N = NU +ND
The transfer to the consumer is equal to tax revenue.
R = TEPEXE + TMPMXM + TDPDXD + TLPL(L
f
D + L
f
E) + TKPK(K
f
D +K
f
E)
Parameters in the model are: production and utility function parameters; en-
dowments of time, capital and foreign exchange; and tax rates. Parameter values
are determined by the calibration process.
APPENDIX 2: DATA
The data required for the model are:
E exports (% of GDP)
M imports (% of GDP)
I investment (% of GDP)
RD tax revenue from VATs and sales taxes (%GDP)
RE tax revenue from export taxes (% GDP)
RM tax revenue from import taxes (% GDP)
RK tax revenue from capital taxes (% GDP)
RL tax revenue from labour taxes (% GDP)
TD tax rate on domestic goods and services
TK tax rate on capital (corporate tax rate)
TL tax rate on labour
αU labour-output ratio in production of untaxed
Country-specific data are set out in Table 8. All country-specific data were
obtained from IMF Statistical Annexes to country reports, available on the internet
at www.imf.org. Table 8 also reports the year for which the data apply, and
whether the country had a VAT in that year.
Countries which separately report the VAT/sales tax on imported goods are:
Eritrea, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, São Tomé
and Principe, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. In other countries, the tax
revenue data do not distinguish between VAT/sales tax on domestic goods and
VAT/sales tax on imported goods. This distinction is important for the calibration
of our model, so we estimate the VAT on domestic goods (Rd), according to the
following procedure: Rd = R x N/(N+Mc) where R = reported revenue from
VAT/sales tax; Mc = Imports x consumption/(consumption+investment) = share
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Table 8: Country-Specific Data
Year E M I RD RE RM RK RL Rev TD TK TL GDPpc
Congo, Dem. Rep. 2005 34.0 45.7 13.9 2.0 0.3 4.4 0.8 0.7 8.2 0.13 0.4 0.2 89
Burundi 2005 11.4 45.3 10.8 6.0 0.0 6.0 2.9 1.4 16.3 0.17 0.35 0.35 100
Malawi 2002 25.3 43.8 9.9 2.8 0.0 6.5 2.3 3.4 15.0 0.175 0.3 0.32 129
Guinea-Bissau 2005 37.6 55.1 14.6 0.9 1.3 6.4 1.2 0.8 10.6 0.15 0.3 0.22 134
Ethiopia* 2007 12.8 32.2 25.0 1.7 0.0 5.4 1.3 1.1 9.5 0.15 0.3 0.25 146
Niger* 2003 15.8 16.3 25.8 1.9 1.0 4.5 1.1 0.7 9.2 0.19 0.35 0.32 167
Eritrea 2001 2.5 55.5 19.9 3.8 0.0 5.3 5.0 1.8 15.8 0.12 0.3 0.25 181
Central African Rep.* 2006 13.9 21.7 8.8 2.8 0.4 2.2 1.0 0.7 7.2 0.19 0.3 0.35 223
Madagascar* 2004 31.7 48.0 27.5 1.9 0.0 6.8 0.9 0.8 10.3 0.2 0.3 0.15 229
Rwanda* 2003 8.3 27.6 18.4 3.0 0.0 5.0 1.9 1.8 11.8 0.18 0.35 0.3 239
Togo* 2006 40.5 60.1 13.0 1.6 0.0 9.6 1.7 0.2 13.1 0.18 0.37 0.22 240
Burkina Faso* 2003 8.9 21.7 17.0 3.2 0.0 4.2 1.5 1.0 10.0 0.18 0.2 0.2 241
Uganda* 2001 15.7 18.6 16.6 3.4 0.0 7.3 1.5 1.1 13.4 0.17 0.3 0.2 244
Ghana* 2004 37.0 57.7 27.9 3.2 1.2 7.5 2.9 2.7 17.5 0.125 0.28 0.275 272
Chad* 2005 54.9 21.0 20.2 0.6 0.1 1.5 0.8 1.1 4.0 0.18 0.4 0.4 274
Mali* 2004 24.6 32.0 20.7 3.4 0.3 8.1 1.2 1.5 14.5 0.18 0.35 0.28 276
Mozambique* 2004 30.0 39.3 20.1 2.5 0.1 3.1 0.8 1.8 8.3 0.17 0.32 0.25 295
Tanzania* 2003 17.8 26.7 18.6 2.7 0.0 4.7 0.8 1.7 9.9 0.2 0.3 0.25 299
Gambia 2007 54.0 69.9 25.0 1.4 0.0 12.4 3.0 2.2 19.0 0.15 0.35 0.2 320
Benin* 2006 11.3 22.6 18.1 3.2 0.0 8.3 2.1 1.4 15.0 0.18 0.38 0.33 324
Zambia* 2003 24.7 45.9 25.6 4.3 0.0 5.1 1.2 6.7 17.3 0.175 0.35 0.25 333
Sudan* 1999 8.1 15.1 16.7 1.1 0.1 3.0 0.9 0.1 5.2 0.1 0.4 0.25 350
Guinea* 2004 21.0 25.4 11.4 2.7 0.0 3.5 0.8 0.6 7.4 0.18 0.35 0.23 397
Kenya* 2002 26.0 31.4 13.4 5.2 0.0 5.8 3.5 2.6 17.1 0.18 0.3 0.2 403
Nigeria* 2004 49.7 41.5 23.9 1.0 0.0 3.9 7.3 1.8 14.1 0.05 0.3 0.2 409
Mauritania* 2002 40.0 52.6 26.8 3.4 0.0 6.5 2.1 2.5 14.5 0.14 0.25 0.26 413
Senegal* 2003 28.5 41.5 23.4 4.1 0.0 9.0 1.5 2.7 17.2 0.18 0.33 0.28 471
Zimbabwe 2001 14.8 25.7 5.6 4.0 0.0 3.7 2.5 7.5 17.7 0.15 0.3 0.35 564
Cote d’Ivoire* 2001 40.6 32.9 9.7 2.9 2.5 5.3 1.5 2.3 14.5 0.18 0.35 0.4 599
Cameroon* 2005 23.5 28.8 18.1 6.9 0.0 4.7 1.7 1.3 14.6 0.175 0.35 0.3 678
Congo, Rep.* 2004 84.4 57.3 24.2 0.7 0.0 4.9 1.8 1.3 8.7 0.18 0.38 0.3 1046
Cape Verde* 2005 16.9 50.9 37.9 4.7 0.0 8.7 3.8 2.9 20.0 0.15 0.2 0.275 1343
Swaziland 2007 76.9 87.2 16.2 0.8 0.2 28.4 2.7 5.1 37.2 0.14 0.3 0.26 1401
Namibia* 2005 52.2 52.5 26.0 3.1 0.0 13.7 3.8 6.5 27.1 0.15 0.35 0.345 2133
South Africa* 2005 21.5 25.9 18.2 6.1 0.0 4.3 6.0 8.3 24.6 0.14 0.3 0.35 3429
Gabon* 2003 54.2 30.1 26.4 3.1 0.8 4.9 1.8 1.7 12.3 0.18 0.35 0.25 4235
Botswana* 2005 49.8 35.1 34.8 2.6 0.0 8.4 2.4 1.8 15.2 0.1 0.25 0.2 4382
Equatorial Guinea* 2006 86.8 33.1 32.5 0.2 0.1 0.5 8.6 0.7 10.1 0.15 0.35 0.25 7470
Average 31.8 38.8 20.1 2.9 0.2 6.4 2.3 2.2 14.0 0.16 0.32 0.27 907
* indicates countries with a VAT. Rev is the sum of revenues from the five taxes considered,
not total tax revenue. GDP per capita is expressed in constant 2000 US$, for the relevant year
for each country. GDP per capita is taken from the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators. All other data are drawn from IMF Country Report Statistical Annexes.
Table 9: Labour-Output Ratios in Untaxed Goods (%)
Malawi South Africa Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Average
58.66 53.99 43.79 53.15 49.70 51.86
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of imported goods that are consumed rather than invested; N = Consumption -
Mc = consumption of non-imported goods. We add (R-Rd) to the revenue from
import taxes.
The countries of the Southern African Customs Union (Botswana, Lesotho,
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) share imports tax revenue according to a
formula that gives a reduced share of the revenue to South Africa. Our calibration
method is inaccurate to the extent that the formula differs from the share of
regional imports that is consumed by each country.
In the absence of data on the labour-output ratio in the informal economy, the
model uses the average ratio for the five countries of Table 9, supposing that the
ratio is constant across all countries. These data are derived from social accounting
matrices prepared by the International Food Policy Research Institute. Among
other data, the SAMs provide for each commodity: the value-added by each factor;
exports of each commodity; domestic demand for the commodity; and goods taxes
paid. We classified commodities as untaxed if the taxes paid on the commodity
constituted less than 5% of the value of domestic output of the commodity. Let
Li denote the labour share of value added for each commodity i. Let U be the set
of untaxed goods, and Ui be the value-added of each untaxed good i. The labour-
output ratio for untaxed is then calculated as
P
i(Li×Ui)P
i Ui
∀i ∈ U . For comparison,
the average labour-output ratio for exports is 36.86%, and for domestic is 43.28%.
The administrative costs of tax collection presented in Table 4 are derived
from various sources. For the United States: IRS Data Book, FY2002, avail-
able at: www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/02db30cs.xls; For other OECD countries – au-
thors’ calculations based on the following tax agency annual reports: Australia –
ATO Annual Report 2002, available at www.ato.gov.au; United Kingdom – In-
land Revenue, Annual Report for the year ending 31st March 2002, available at
www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/pdfs/report2002.pdf; New Zealand – Inland Revenue
Annual Report 2001-2002, available at: www.ird.govt. nz/aboutir/reports/annual-
02.pdf; and Canada: Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, 2001-2002 Annual Re-
port to Parliament, Financial Statements, available at www.cra-arc.gc.ca/agency/
annual/2001-2002/. For Guatemala: simple average of adjusted figures from Mann
(2002). Ghana: revenue-weighted average of figures cited by Terkper (1995).
Namibia: statistics provided by Klaus Schade of the Namibian Economic Policy
Research Unit. Tanzania: statistics provided by Odd-Helge Fjeldstad of the Chr.
Michelsen Institute. Remaining countries: Taliercio (2004). We are very grateful
to Klaus Schade, Odd-Helge Fjeldstad and Robert Taliercio for their assistance in
obtaining these data.
APPENDIX 3: Model Calibration
The economic relationships in the model can be represented by a rectangular
SAM such as Table 10. The entries in the SAM are expressed as percentages of
GDP at market value. All rows and columns sum to zero, reflecting a Walrasian
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Table 10: SAM for Guinea-Bissau 2005
Consumer Untaxed Domestic Exports Imports Investment Foreign Govt
Untaxed -47.97 47.97
Domestic -6.65 5.79 0.87
Exports 36.38 -37.65 1.27
Imports -48.26 48.69 -6.83 6.41
Foreign Exchange 11.04 -48.69 37.65
Inv. inputs (IN) 6.90 0.83 -7.73
Investment Good -8.17 -0.98 -5.42 14.57
Informal Capital 26.51 -11.67 -2.34 -12.51
Formal Capital 4.14 -0.65 -3.49
Informal Labour 46.73 -35.03 -1.75 -9.95
Formal Labor 3.83 -0.57 -3.26
Capital Taxes -0.20 -1.05 1.24
Labour Taxes -0.13 -0.72 0.84
Transfers 10.62 -10.62
Figures represent a percentage of GDP at market value. The tax inclusive value of production
of all goods except imports sums to 100.
equilibrium in which incomes equal expenditures. In the consumer’s column posi-
tive entries are endowments or factor incomes, negative figures are expenditures on
goods, including investment. In the production columns, positive entries are the
receipt of sales revenue or investment, and negative entries are payments to factors
or factor taxes. In the government’s column, positive figures are tax revenues, the
negative figure is the transfer to consumers. The ‘Foreign’ column represents the
purchase of exports and the sale of imports by the rest of the world, using foreign
exchange.
Benchmark quantities of goods and factors (entries in the SAM) are calculated
using the following equations:
XD =
RD
TD
production of domestic
XE = E −RE production of exports
XM =M −RM quantity of imports
A¯ = XM − E endowment of foreign exchange
C = 100− I − (E −M) aggregate consumption
MC =M × CC+I share of imports that is consumed
XU = C −MC −XD −RD production of untaxed
MI =M × IC+I imports input into investment good
INU = (I −MI)× XUXU+XD untaxed input into investment good
IND = (I −MI)× XDXU+XD domestic input into investment good
IU = I × XU+I
N
U
XU+I
N
U +XD+I
N
D+XE
investment in untaxed production
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IDE = I × XD+I
N
D+XE
XU+I
N
U +XD+I
N
D+XE
investment in other production
KfD =
XD+I
N
D
XD+I
N
D+XE
RK
TK
formal capital used to produce
domestic
KfE =
XE
XD+I
N
D+XE
RK
TK
formal capital used to produce
exports
LfD =
XD+I
N
D
XD+I
N
D+XE
RL
TL
formal labour used to produce do-
mestic
LfE =
XE
XD+I
N
D+XE
RL
TL
formal labour used to produce ex-
ports
FF = KfD +K
f
E + L
f
D + L
f
E Cost of formal factors
FS = XD + I
N
D +XE − IDE Sales of formal output, less in-
vestment costs
AF = FS − FF −RK −RL Funds distributed to informal fac-
tors in formal sector
KiD = AF × K
f
D
FF
informal capital used to produce
domestic
KiE = AF × K
f
E
FF
informal capital used to produce
exports
LiD = AF × L
f
D
FF
informal labour used to produce
domestic
LiE = AF × L
f
E
FF
informal labour used to produce
exports
KiU = (1− αU)(XU + INU − IU) informal capital used to produce
untaxed
LiU = αU(XU + I
N
U − IU) informal labour used to produce
untaxed
ID = XD + I
N
D − (KfD +KiD + LfD +
LiD +
XD+I
N
D
XD+I
N
D+XE
RK +
XD+I
N
D
XD+I
N
D+XE
RL)
investment in domestic
IE = XE − (KfE + KiE + LfE + LiE +
XE
XD+I
N
D+XE
RK +
XE
XD+I
N
D+XE
RL)
investment in exports
K¯ = KfE +K
f
D +K
i
E +K
i
D +K
i
U total capital endowment
L = LfE + L
f
D + L
i
E + L
i
D + L
i
U total labour supply
T¯ = LL endowment of time, where L is
elasticity of labour supply
Tax rates on exports and imports are calibrated, rather than being drawn
directly from the legal tax rates:
TE =
RE
XE
tax rate on exports
TM =
RM
XM
tax rate on imports
We do not observe price or quantities of goods, but we do observe the total
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amount of money spent on each good (values as a percentage of GDP). Following
the Harberger convention we choose units of the aggregate goods such that quan-
tities equal values. This implies that initial prices equal one. Where goods are
taxed, goods units can be chosen such that either the gross of tax or net of tax
price equals one. We chose units such that the agent supplying the good or factor
received a price of one, with remaining prices implied by tax rates:
PwM = 1 world price of imports (and foreign exchange)
PI = 1 price of investment
PU = 1 price of untaxed
PL = 1 wage received by labour (formal or informal); also the wage paid by
producers for informal labour
PK = 1 wage received by capital (formal or informal); also the wage paid by
producers for informal capital
PD = 1 producer price of domestic
PE = 1 producer price of exports
An n-factor CES production function, F = A(
∑n
j=1 θjX
ρ
j )
1
ρ , with factors Xj,
share parameters θj, scale parameter A, and elasticity of substitution σ = 11−ρ , can
be rewritten in calibrated form as
F = F¯
[
n∑
i=1
(
p¯iX¯i∑n
j=1 p¯jX¯j
)(
Xi
X¯i
)ρ] 1ρ
where a bar over a variable indicates the observed benchmark level. The bench-
mark factor demands, factor prices and product outputs, combined with the elas-
ticities of substitution fully specify the three production functions. The Cobb-
Douglas coefficients in the base case are θj = p¯iX¯iPn
j=1 p¯jX¯j
j = 1, ..., n. The same
methodology can be used for the CES utility function, where the Xis represent
goods consumed, the pis are goods prices, and the benchmark utility level is nor-
malized to unity.
The calibration process is completed with the selection of substitution elas-
ticities for production and utility functions. In our base case we chose unitary
elasticities.
The calibration process provides estimates of the untaxed economy, which we
treat as synonymous with the informal economy. There is overlap between our
measures of the untaxed economy, and measures of the ‘shadow’ economy, as sug-
gested in Table 11. As discussed in the main text, however, our estimates are larger
to the extent that they include legal untaxed activities (eg informal agriculture),
and smaller to the extent that they do not include illegal activities that are not
caught by official GDP statistics. The coefficient of correlation with Schneider’s
(2005) measure of the shadow economy is 0.29 in the case of untaxed goods, and
0.17 in the case of untaxed factors.
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Table 11: Size of the Informal Sector (% GDP)
U Ki+ Li Shadow
Untaxed good sales Informal factors Economy
Equatorial Guinea 2.7 30.6
Chad 27.7 72.6 48.0
Cameroon 18.0 63.0 34.9
Congo, Rep. 5.7 62.7 50.1
Congo, Dem. Rep. 40.0 76.7 49.7
Botswana 1.6 39.5 34.6
Nigeria 16.4 32.3 59.4
Mauritania 18.1 47.4 37.9
Gabon 9.5 54.3
Togo 42.6 77.9 40.4
Mozambique 39.8 65.1 42.4
South Africa 15.2 18.1 29.5
Madagascar 40.7 61.2 41.6
Zambia 31.4 32.2 50.8
Guinea 52.9 80.0 41.3
Guinea Bissau 47.9 69.6
Ghana 20.9 41.8 43.6
Gambia 25.4 48.6
Cape Verde 23.6 21.4
Burundi 40.0 66.7 38.7
Kenya 30.8 50.6 36.0
Senegal 30.1 54.1 47.5
Cote d’Ivoire 34.0 71.1 45.2
Namibia 11.4 31.1 33.4
Eritrea 49.2 45.8
Central African Rep. 61.3 81.0 46.1
Swaziland 13.0 46.4
Tanzania 52.3 66.5 60.2
Malawi 50.4 63.4 42.1
Burkina Faso 56.1 64.8 43.3
Ethiopia 55.9 62.1 42.1
Mali 38.4 63.9 44.7
Sudan 65.3 78.4
Zimbabwe 49.9 50.8 63.2
Rwanda 58.1 63.3 42.2
Uganda 47.0 66.6 45.4
Niger 51.0 64.1 43.8
Benin 53.3 65.4 49.1
Average 34.9 56.6 44.2
Values of untaxed good sales and informal factors used to produce formal goods are from our
calibration algorithm. Values of the ‘shadow’ economy are from Schneider (2005). Countries
are ordered by MCF(All).
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Table 12: MCFs in the Informal Sector
Country U Ki KiDE L
i LiDE
Equatorial Guinea 0.87 0.82 0.83 0.89 0.98
Chad 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.96 0.98
Cameroon 0.82 0.92 0.97 0.93 0.98
Congo, Rep. 0.89 0.94 0.96 0.96 0.97
Congo, Dem. Rep. 0.92 0.97 1.06 0.98 1.05
Botswana 0.75 0.89 0.90 0.91 0.92
Nigeria 0.85 0.80 0.83 0.87 0.93
Mauritania 0.85 0.90 0.97 0.90 0.97
Gabon 0.83 0.92 0.97 0.94 0.98
Togo 0.90 0.95 1.04 0.98 1.18
Mozambique 0.92 0.96 1.07 0.95 1.02
South Africa 0.72 0.70 0.82 0.67 0.77
Madagascar 0.90 0.95 1.12 0.96 1.10
Zambia 0.83 0.86 -0.26 0.73 0.69
Guinea 0.92 0.97 1.10 0.98 1.11
Guinea Bissau 0.90 0.93 1.09 0.96 1.08
Ghana 0.82 0.86 0.96 0.86 0.97
Gambia 0.82 0.84 0.94 0.89 0.98
Cape Verde 0.79 0.72 0.94 0.73 1.00
Burundi 0.86 0.91 1.02 0.93 1.11
Kenya 0.82 0.85 0.98 0.88 1.02
Senegal 0.83 0.90 1.09 0.89 1.02
Cote d’Ivoire 0.86 0.94 1.06 0.93 1.03
Namibia 0.70 0.75 0.85 0.74 0.82
Eritrea 0.84 0.76 1.02 0.87 1.27
Central African Rep. 0.93 0.96 1.13 0.97 1.17
Swaziland 0.68 0.81 0.95 0.82 0.90
Tanzania 0.90 0.95 1.22 0.93 1.13
Malawi 0.86 0.89 1.10 0.87 1.06
Burkina Faso 0.90 0.91 1.19 0.93 1.26
Ethiopia 0.90 0.92 1.26 0.93 1.29
Mali 0.86 0.93 1.15 0.93 1.11
Sudan 0.95 0.97 1.15 0.99 1.26
Zimbabwe 0.82 0.86 -3.10 0.77 0.35
Rwanda 0.88 0.89 1.32 0.89 1.33
Uganda 0.86 0.91 1.13 0.92 1.16
Niger 0.90 0.94 1.24 0.96 1.30
Benin 0.85 0.89 1.29 0.91 1.39
Average 0.85 0.89 0.90 0.90 1.04
Maximum 0.95 0.97 1.32 0.99 1.39
Minimum 0.68 0.70 -3.10 0.67 0.35
Std. Dev. 0.06 0.07 0.71 0.08 0.19
Countries are ordered by MCF(All).
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